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 Financial Security Issuance and Cash Savings through Tax Planning 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate how firms’ issuance of equity and debt securities are associated 
with cash savings through tax planning. According to the pecking order theory of Myers and 
Majluf (1984), due to higher cost of capital attributed to information asymmetry, firms use the 
least costly financial resources, such as cash on hand followed by debt issuance and equity issuance 
to carry out investments. However, the literature on pecking order theory has not considered cash 
savings through risky tax planning. Since issuance of shares is the most costly and the last resort 
for raising capital, and issuance of debt is less costly and signals firms’ profitability, we predict 
that firms that issue shares will save more cash via aggressive tax planning than firms that issue 
debt, which are not expected to engage in as much aggressive tax planning.  
Using a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms for the period 1987-2016, we find that an increase 
in share issuance is associated with a decrease in cash effective tax rate (CASH-ETR), indicating 
that firms that issue shares save cash by tax planning. We do not find any evidence that debt 
issuance reduces CASH-ETR or induce tax avoidance behavior. Our findings are robust when we 
use first difference estimation method, propensity score matching, and gross equity and debt 
issuances as explanatory variables, instead of net equity and debt issuances. This study provides 
insights into the interplay between the taxing authority and shareholders, especially when firms 
raise external capital. 
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Financial Security Issuance and Cash Savings through Tax Planning 
1 INTRODUCTION 
“Looking for year-end cash? Make all the right tax moves — from changing your accounting 
to buying capital equipment now, rather than later — and you may strike a hidden cash vein.” 
Leone, 2008. CFO.com 
"The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual pursuit that carries any reward." A quote attributed to 
John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946): 
We investigate how firms’ issuance of financial securities, such as debt and equity, is associated 
with corporate tax planning for cash savings.1 Existing studies examine the relationship between 
financial constraints and tax planning strategy using various proxies such as Altman Z-scores to 
measure financial constraints (Chen and Lai, 2012; Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin, 2016; Law and 
Mills, 2015). The implicit assumption of these studies is that financially constrained firms are less 
capable of raising external funds. However, these studies do not consider explicitly on how debt 
and/or equity issuance may affect tax planning. Disentangling the effects of these two types of 
financial security issuance on corporate tax planning is important as they indicate or signal two 
different abilities of raising external capital for investments and may help us understand the 
interplay between the shareholders and the taxing authority better, especially at the time when 
firms have to raise funds for investments.  
                                                             
1In this study, the terms share-issuance and equity-issuance are used interchangeably.  
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To motivate the relation between security issuance and risky tax planning for cash savings, we 
employ pecking order theory, which ranks financial resources for investment according to their 
level of risk to investors and, in turn, cost to the firm (Myers, 1984). In favor of pecking order 
theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, in order to avoid the high costs of financing attributed 
to information asymmetry, firms use the least costly financial resources first, such as cash on hand 
followed by debt issuance and they only use costly equity issuance when other financing is not 
available, to carry out their investment plans. However, pecking order theory does not consider 
obtaining cash from a risky tax avoidance strategy, which is a potential source for funding 
investments.2 Therefore, we investigate whether firms engage in tax avoidance when they are able 
to raise funds externally through debt and equity issuance. Typically, going to a debt market to 
raise funds for investment signals a greater level of solvency or profitability (Albring et al., 2011; 
Best and Zhang, 1993) and may reflect a lesser need to engage in risky tax avoidance strategies. 
Besides, as Albring et al. (2011) and Meneghetti (2012) imply, when managers issue debt they 
submit themselves to lenders’ monitoring. Hasan et al. (2014) document that debt holders penalize 
firms for their tax aggressive behavior by imposing higher costs of debt. For these reasons, we 
predict that debt issuance will be either negatively or not significantly associated with tax 
avoidance.  
Conversely, when firms exhaust their ability to raise debt or when the cost of debt is too high 
for them, they issue equity to carry out investments. According to pecking order theory, equity 
issuance is the most costly and the last resort for financing. Leone (2008) noted that a credit crunch 
or low liquidity leads corporations to save cash from tax planning. We argue that when firms issue 
                                                             
2In this paper, we are using aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance synonymously.  
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equity, they will also engage in such tax planning, which generates additional cash, in order to 
minimize the cost of capital and amass sufficient funds for their investments. Hence, we expect 
that equity issuance will be positively associated with tax avoidance.3  
We test our predictions using cash effective tax rates (CASH-ETR) as the proxy for tax 
avoidance. CASH-ETR is defined as the total amount of cash taxes paid in a given year over the 
worldwide pretax income. CASH-ETR is a commonly used proxy for tax planning to generate 
cash savings, as it reflects both a firm’s long-term and short-term tax deferral strategies (see 
Edwards et al., 2016). We measure share issuance (debt issuance) as the net proceeds from issuing 
and repurchasing (retiring) shares (debt). We use net share and debt issuance because they reflect 
the actual need for external cash flow for investments. A negative (positive) relation of our 
independent variable of interest with CASH-ETR suggests a positive (negative) relation with tax 
avoidance or cash savings via tax planning because lower ETR represents a higher level of tax 
avoidance.  
We apply ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and control for year and industry fixed effects 
on a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms for the period 1987-2016. We find that share (debt) 
issuance has a negative (positive) and statistically significant relationship with CASH-ETR. The 
results  from our sample suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the amount of share 
(debt) issuance is associated with a 3.82 (3.16) percent decrease (increase) in CASH-ETR, which 
can be translated into $3.20 million ($2.65 million) cash savings (more tax payments) per firm on 
                                                             
3One could argue that the relationship runs in both directions; that is- tax avoidance also reduces firms’ need to issue 
financial securities. Regarding this, extant research suggests that one of the main reasons for tax avoidance behavior 
is to meet a need for additional cash (Edwards et al., 2016; Law and Mills, 2015). Hence, generating funds 
externally indicates a need for additional funds for investments. So, we believe the direction of the relation runs 
from share/debt issuance to tax avoidance. However, to address this potential simultaneity bias, in a robustness 
check test, we regress CASH-ETR on lagged explanatory variables.  
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average.  Such findings may imply that when firms issue shares, they engage in tax avoidance by 
reducing CASH-ETR to obtain additional cash for their investments.   
We apply a battery of robustness tests to address concerns related to endogeneity or 
measurement errors. First, we apply propensity score matching to match firms that issue shares (or 
debt) with similar firms, which do not issue shares (or debt) to address selection bias or model 
misspecification concern. We document that our results are robust to applying propensity score 
matching statistical method. We use first difference regression to mitigate correlated omitted 
variable bias. We regress changes in CASH-ETR between year t and t-1 on changes in explanatory 
variables between the same years. We find that an increase in debt issuance is associated with an 
increase in CASH-ETR and an increase in share issuance is associated with a decrease in CASH-
ETR. It is also possible that our baseline regression suffers from simultaneity or reverse causality 
bias. Therefore, we employ a lagged specification of our model by regressing CASH-ETR on 
lagged explanatory variables. The lagged specification regression models also support our 
argument that share issuance increases tax avoidance. As we do not believe that the issuance of 
shares and debt persist from one period to the next, the lagged specification is likely to serve as a 
causality test for our study. In addition, we find that high share issuance (top quartile observations 
of the sample) has a positive association with tax avoidance. We also report that share issuance 
has a positive association with future tax avoidance at year t+1 and t+2 as well as long-term tax 
avoidance measured by taking three-year average CASH-ETR.  
In further analysis, we test whether tax avoidance strategy is related to uncertain tax positions. 
Effective from December 15, 2006, FASB’s Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) requires 
firms to disclose uncertain tax benefits (UTBs) that are less than 50 percent likely to be sustained 
if a tax audit were conducted. Among other items, FIN 48 also requires firms to disclose the 
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amount of tax settlements related to UTB with the IRS upon tax audit. We find that while there is 
no significant association between share issuance and UTBs, there is a negative association 
between share issuance and tax settlements. This insignificant (significant) relation of share 
issuance with UTBs (tax settlements) suggests that the tax avoidance strategy induced by share 
issuance is not based on weak tax positions. This finding may also imply that when firms issue 
shares, the IRS considers their tax planning favorably and reduces the amount of settlements that 
arise from their overall uncertain tax positions induced by other factors.    
Overall, we contribute both to the capital structure and tax avoidance literature. Specifically, 
our study complements Law and Mills (2015) and Edwards et al. (2016). They find that when 
firms are financially constrained, they opt for tax avoidance. However, “financially constrained” 
conditions may reflect many financial issues and do not shed light on the effect of specific financial 
conditions, such as those leading to financial security issuances, on tax avoidance. Our evidence 
suggests that when firms issue equity, they tend to engage in tax avoidance strategies. We also 
contribute to the debt issuance and tax avoidance literatures by providing evidence that when firms 
are capable of issuing debt they do not tend to engage in tax avoidance. This evidence contributes 
to the work of Hasan et al. (2014) who find that tax avoidance increases the costs of borrowing. 
While Hasan et al. (2014) focus on the consequences of tax avoidance, our study emphasizes the 
effects of investment needs leading to shares and debt issuance on tax avoidance. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews literature and presents arguments 
leading to our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample selection procedure and research design. 
Results and additional analysis are provided in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Conclusions are 
made in section 6. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Firms encountering financial constraints experience an increased cost of capital or cost of 
borrowing (Edwards et al., 2016). In such circumstances, firms tend to exploit all possible means 
of saving cash internally. One such means is tax avoidance: diverting wealth from the government 
(tax payables) to shareholders (Law and Mills, 2015). Law and Mills (2015) and Edwards et al. 
(2016) study the relations between firms’ financial constraints and tax avoidance behavior. Law 
and Mills (2015) use the total number of negative words in firms’ annual 10-K filings to proxy for 
a qualitative measure of financial constraints and find that firms that are more financially 
constrained have higher unrecognized tax benefit (UTBs) balances, representing more tax 
aggressiveness.  Their study also finds that financial constraints are associated with future tax 
aggressiveness reflected in future higher UTB balances and effective tax rates (ETR). Edwards et 
al. (2016) apply both macroeconomic financial constraints, measured by the change in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and firm-level financial constraints, measured by Altman Z-scores and 
KZ index (see section 3 for details about the measures). They document that financially 
constrained firms engage in higher levels of tax avoidance measured by the change in CASH ETR. 
To proxy for financial constraints, Chen and Lai (2012) use KZ index and WW index developed 
by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006), respectively along with a payout 
dummy variable. They find evidence of a similar relation between financial constraints and firms’ 
aggressive tax planning.45 However, none of these studies specifically considers how firms’ access 
to external finance (debt and share issuance) could influence tax avoidance behavior. 
                                                             
4Dyreng and Markle examine the relation between financial constraints and income shifting by the U.S. 
multinational firms. They document that financially constrained firms do not shift as much income to foreign 
countries as their counterpart firms which are not financially constrained.  
5Many other determinants of tax avoidance are thoroughly reviewed in Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Hanlon 
and Heitzman (2010). 
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The pecking order theory provides a rational explanation for capital structure. It ranks internal 
and external financing options according to levels of risk to investors. In turn, it predicts that to 
avoid high costs of external financing, firms issue stocks to carry out a positive NPV project only 
after exhausting other sources of internal and external financing, such as cash and debt (including 
low and high risk debt), respectively (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Empirical evidence 
from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Jong et al. (2011) and others corroborates that pecking 
order theory explains capital structure.6  
Going to a debt market to raise funds for investment signals a greater level of solvency or 
profitability (Albring et al., 2011; Best and Zhang, 1993), which may increase the stock price of a 
company. It may also reflect a lesser need to engage in risky tax avoidance strategies. Albring et 
al. (2011) and Meneghetti (2012) suggest that managers have incentives to issue debt and submit 
themselves to lenders’ monitoring in order to increase the value of their compensation portfolios 
that are aligned with stock market performance. Hasan et al. (2014) document that tax avoidance 
affects the cost of debt positively.7 This finding implies that lenders perceive tax avoidance 
behavior as risky firm activity and penalize firms with high cost of debt for such behavior. Hence, 
it is possible that by not engaging in tax avoidance managers want to signal to lenders that the 
underlying firms are not financially constrained. Thus, we expect that debt issuance will have 
either no or a positive relationship with CASH-ETR. In other words, debt issuance will have either 
negative or no association with tax avoidance. Therefore, we state our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Debt issuance has a non-negative association with cash effective tax rates. 
                                                             
6However, some studies such as Fama and French (2005) and, Gatchev, Spindt and Tarhan (2009), among others, do 
not seem to find evidence in favor of pecking order theory. 
7By using likelihood of experiencing future extreme negative stock returns as a proxy for stock price crash, Kim et 
al. (2011) find that there is a positive association tax avoidance and stock price crash, suggesting that through tax 
avoidance firms hide bad news which may lead to stock price crash when it “crosses a tipping point.” 
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Our prediction is different for equity issuance. From the pecking order theory, we know that 
equity issuance is the last resort to raise external capital. Since external capital is costly and 
investment projects tend to require large sums of funds, managers are likely to exploit additional 
channels of cash savings before accessing capital markets. Leone (2008) hints that a liquidity crisis 
can incentivize firms to carry out cash savings by tax planning. Thus, we argue that while issuing 
equity, firms will engage in tax avoidance to generate sufficient funds for investments and to 
achieve optimum levels of cost of capital.   
H2: Share issuance has a negative association with cash effective cash rates. 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
We apply OLS regression to test our hypotheses. The generated standard errors are based on 
firm-level clustering (robust standard errors). We control for year and industry fixed effects as well 
as the commonly used determinants of tax avoidance identified in the tax avoidance literature.     
We estimate the following model to test our hypotheses. For simplicity, we do not include time 
and firm subscripts in the model. 
!"#ℎ%&' = )* +	)-. + ∑)0!123415# + 6	 (1) 
 
X represents debt issuance for hypothesis 1 and share issuance for hypothesis 2.   
Tax planning proxy 
Edwards et al. (2016) use CASH-ETR to investigate how financial constraints affect cash 
savings from tax planning. Similarly, for addressing our research questions of how issuances of 
shares and debt influence tax planning, CASH-ETR is an ideal measure because it reflects cash 
savings from tax planning.  We construct CASH-ETR as the amount of total taxes paid on 
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worldwide pretax income adjusted for special items. The federal statutory tax rate in the U.S. until 
2017 was 35% of pretax income. If firms pay foreign taxes, they get equivalent amount of tax 
credits in the U.S.A. Thus, if CASH-ETR is lower than this rate, it is an indication of firm’s tax 
planning for cash savings. Consistent with the tax literature we winsorize CASH-ETR and other 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We also bound CASH-ETR between zero and one if 
observations are negative and greater than one, respectively. ΔCASH-ETR is the change in CASH-
ETR between year t and year t-1.  
Measuring Share Issuance 
Floyd et al. (2015) define share repurchase as the net of gross share repurchase minus gross share 
issuance. Following their definition of share repurchase, we define share issuance as the net 
proceeds from issuing and repurchasing shares over total assets. In other words, share issuance 
equals proceeds from gross share issuance (SSTK) minus share repurchase (PRSTKC) scaled by 
total asset (AT). If share issuance is negative, we replace it with zero values because negative 
values indicate that the amount of share repurchase is higher than the total proceeds from share 
issuance. 
Measuring Debt Issuance 
Similarly, we measure debt issuance as the net proceeds from issuing and retiring debt. In other 
words, debt issuance equals proceeds from gross debt issuance (DLTIS) minus debt retirement 
(DLTR) scaled by total asset (AT). We consider net proceeds because they reflect a firm’s overall 
need for external finance. However, as a robustness test, we use gross share and debt issuance 
instead of net share and debt issuance.  
Controls variables 
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Consistent with Dyreng et al. (2017), Edwards et al. (2016), Law and Mills (2015) and other tax 
avoidance studies, we include the following control variables in our model.  
Z-score: The Altman (1968) Z-score is a financial constraint measure -calculated as 
 -1*{3.3* [(PI + XINT)/AT] + 1.2* (WCAP/AT) + (SALE/AT) + 1.4* (RE/AT) + 0.6* [(CHSO 
*PRCC_F)/LT]}. (2) 
The formula is borrowed from Edwards et al. (2016). Z-scores capture the level of financial 
distress of a firm. 
KZ index: Chen and Lai (2012) and Edwards et al. (2016) use KZ index of Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) as one of the proxies for financial constraint. The index is calculated as 
-1*CashFlowK [(IB + DP)/lag(PPENT)] + 0.28 * Q [(AT + PRCC_F – CSHO - CEQ - 
TXDB)/AT] + 3.13 * DebtTotalCapital [(DLTT + DLC)/(DLTT + DLC + SEQ)] - 39.36 * 
DividendsK [(DVC + DVP)/lag(PPENT)] - 1.31* CashK [CHE/lag(PPENT)]. (3) 
The formula is borrowed from Edwards et al. (2016). As can be seen from the formula, leverage 
and Tobin’s Q get positive weight whereas operating cash flow, dividend payment and cash 
reserves get negative weights in the KZ index construction. Firms with higher KZ index are 
financially more constrained. 
We include sales to proxy for firm size. It also captures firms’ economic activities for a given 
year (Edwards et al., 2016). Edwards et al. (2016) point out that, conceptually, it is not clear 
whether firm size will have a positive or negative effect on tax avoidance. On one hand, large firms 
have the required resources to carry out transactions that reduce taxes. On the other hand, because 
large firms are mature, they are likely to have exhausted their scopes of tax reductions, which may 
lead to higher effective tax rate. We control for SALES GROWTH to capture for changes in firms’ 
economic activity (Edwards et al., 2016). To capture for profitability, we include pretax return on 
  11 
 
assets (PROA). We define leverage as total debt (long-term debt (DLTT)) scaled by total assets 
(AT). Leverage captures the extent to which debt can shield taxes (Chen and Lai, 2012). PPE is 
defined as the total gross value of property, plant and equipment (PPEGT) scaled by lagged total 
asset. PPE captures a firm’s capital intensity, which reduces tax liability. To control for expenses 
related to the research and development, we scale R&D expense (XRD) by total assets (AT). We 
include foreign income (FI) to control for a firm’s foreign operation, which influences tax 
avoidance behavior. We divide pre-tax income from foreign operations (PIFO) by the total assets 
(AT). NOL- a dummy variable that indicates whether firms have loss carry forward balance 
(TLCF) from their net operating loss. ∆NOL is the amount of change in loss carry forward balance 
between year t and t-1. We scale it by the prior year total assets (AT). 
Sample Selection 
 
We collect financial statement data of North American publicly listed companies from 
Compustat. We exclude regulated firms (utilities industry - SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial 
firms (financial industry- SIC codes 6000-6999). We delete firms if their assets and pretax income 
are missing or negative. We also eliminate observations if CASH-ETR or control variables are 
missing. However, as a large number of R&D observations are missing, consistent with prior 
literature, we replace missing R&D with zeroes. We also replace missing foreign income 
observations with zeros. In order to avoid outlier problems, we winsorize all variables at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. Our sample covers the period of 1987-2016. 
4 RESULTS 
Summary Statistics 
 
In Panel A of Table 1, the descriptive statistics of both the independent variables and the 
dependent variables are presented. In our sample the average cash effective tax rate (CASH-ETR), 
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is about 25% of pretax income adjusted for special items. Firms in our sample, on average,  pay 
lower taxes on their pretax income than the federal tax rate, which is 35% of pretax income. The 
sample mean of gross share and debt issuance are 3.19% and 2.87% of total assets, respectively. 
The sample average long-term leverage and foreign income are about 17% and 1.23% of total 
assets, respectively. The average sample profitability (PROA) is about 10.33% of total assets.  The 
R&D and PPE are, on average, 2.9% of sales, and 63.48% of total assets, respectively. We find 
that our sample average BM is 0.60 meaning book value of equity is 60% of market value of 
equity.  These descriptive statistics are similar to those of Edwards et al. (2016). We also present 
the descriptive statistics for the changes measures in Panel B of Table 1. 
[Insert Panel A of Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Panel B of Table 1 about here] 
In Figure 1, we present the yearly mean CASH-ETR from 1987 to 2016 for four subsamples 
related to net debt and share issuance: 1) if net share issuance is positive, 2) if net share issuance 
is zero, 3) if net debt issuance is positive and 4) if net debt issuance is zero. As can be seen from 
the graph that among the four subsamples, the lowest yearly mean CASH-ETR is observed when 
net share issuance is positive. One might argue that firms that issue shares carry out more 
investment activities and receive tax credits, such as R&D tax credits, that reduce ETR so it does 
not reflect whether they do it for cash savings. But if we observe the CASH-ETRs of firms that 
issue debt, we find that for most of the sample period, the yearly mean CASH-ETRs of firms that 
issue debt (net debt issuance greater than zero) are much higher than those of firms that issue 
shares.  
We also observe that the CASH-ETRs of all subsamples fluctuate together during the sample 
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period, suggesting that their tax planning could be affected by common shocks or macroeconomic 
events.  For instance, the CASH-ETRs of all subsamples drop drastically between 2002 and 2004, 
and between 2010 and 2011. These two periods coincide with the 2003 Bush tax cuts, which 
reduced the tax rate on dividend income at the investor level from 39.6 percent to 15 percent and 
the 2010 Tax Relief Act, which extended the Bush tax cuts for two more years. In addition, during 
the recent financial crisis from 2006 to 2008, the mean CASH-ETR went up for all of the 
subsamples. This observation is surprising because one may naturally think that firms would 
engage in tax avoidance more aggressively during the financial crisis in order to pay their bills and 
ensure their survival. It is possible that during the financial crisis firms fail to take advantage of 
activities that reduce tax liabilities. Lastly, during the beginning of our sample period, all 
subsamples’ average cash ETR were above 30 percent but over time their average CASH-ETR 
declined, suggesting that on average all kinds of firms are avoiding more taxes than before. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Correlations 
 
In Table 2, we present the correlation coefficients of research variables (Pearson correlation 
coefficients are presented in the upper diagonal and Spearman rank coefficients are presented in 
the lower diagonal). The correlation coefficient of CASH-ETR and share issue is negative, whereas 
the correlation coefficient of CASH-ETR and debt issue is positive. While the correlations do not 
provide definite support for our hypotheses, they offer preliminary support for our expected 
relations.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Regression Results 
 
Debt issuance and tax planning 
Our first hypothesis predicts that debt issuance would have non-negative association with 
CASH-ETR, which is our proxy for cash savings from tax planning, as debt issuance signals firms’ 
profitability and, in turn, less need to engage in a tax avoidance strategy. Besides, higher cost of 
borrowing due to tax avoidance would discourage such tax planning when firms are issuing debt 
(Hasan et al., 2014). In Table 3, we present the OLS coefficient for the association between debt 
issuance and CASH-ETR. In Model 1, our specification includes only DEBT-ISSUE. The 
coefficient of debt issue is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. Graphically, we present 
this relationship in figure 2A, which shows that as the debt issuance increases, predicted values of 
CASH-ETR decreases.   
In the subsequent two models, we include two different financial constraints separately (Z-score 
in model 2 and KZ-index in model 3) and the common determinants of tax planning such as ROA, 
sales, sales growth, foreign income, long-term leverage, property plants and equipment (PPE), 
inventory, R&D, discretionary accruals, loss carry forward (NOL), ΔNOL, and lagged CASH-
ETR (see Dyreng et al., 2017, and Edwards et al., 2016). We also include year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects to control for unobservable time and industry effects. In order to address 
concerns related to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, we report the t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors clustered by firms. In both models, we find evidence that debt issuance has 
statistically significant positive effect on CASH-ETR, indicating that when firms issue debt, they 
do not carry out a avoidance strategy. This finding provides support for our first hypothesis about 
the negative relation between debt issuance and tax planning for cash savings. In terms of 
economic significance, the coefficient of 0.1137 (model2) implies that a one standard deviation 
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increase in debt issuance is associated with a 3.16 percent decrease in CASH-ETR on average.8 
This rate translates into a $2.65 million increase in tax payments, given that our sample average 
cash tax payment is $83.74 million. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 2A about here] 
 
Share issuance and cash savings from tax planning 
In Table 4, we present the results from OLS regressions using five different models. To test 
hypothesis 2, we include our main independent variable – share issue – in all five models. In model 
(1), the dependent variable is only SHARE-ISSUE and in the subsequent two models, we replicate 
model (2) and model (3) of Table 3 by replacing DEBT-ISSUE with SHARE-ISSUE. In model (4) 
and model (5), we add DEBT-ISSUE, while controlling for Z-score and KZ-index, respectively, 
along with other controls. We find, in all of the models of Table 4, that the coefficients of SHARE-
ISSUE are negative and statistically significant at the one percent level, indicating that firms 
issuing shares engage in tax avoidance strategies that reduce CASH-ETR. The predicted values of 
CASH-ETR by share issuance, presented in Figure 2B, also support this result.  These findings 
provide support for our second hypothesis. 
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that, when firms issue shares, they engage in 
tax avoidance to obtain additional cash internally to avoid higher costs of external capital. Our 
findings echo the pecking order theory (of Myers and Majluf (1984), which suggests that share 
issuance should be the last resort of financing – to avoid higher costs of capital attributable to 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. We argue, based on our sample evidence, 
                                                             
8The economic significance is calculated as coefficient value multiplied by one standard deviation of debt issue 
deflated by the mean CASH-ETR: 0.1137*0.0702/0.2519=0.0316.  
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that firms view raising capital for investments through debt issuance as less risky and/or cheaper 
than raising it through a tax avoidance strategy. 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 2B about here] 
 
For economic significance, the coefficient value of -0.0922 (Model 2) means that a one standard 
deviation increase in share issuance is associated with 3.82 percent decrease in average CASH-
ETR.  As we mentioned above, because our sample average cash tax payment is $83.74 million, 
the 3.82 percent decrease in CASH-ETR is equivalent to $3.20 million cash savings per firm on 
average.   
5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
High debt and share issuance and CASH-ETR 
The evidence we have provided so far indicates that while on average share issuance has 
negative impact on CASH-ETR, debt issuance has positive impact on CASH-ETR. To provide 
additional evidence, we create two subsamples by constructing two dummy variables. High-share-
issue (high-debt-issue) is a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm’s share (debt) issuance is 
above the third quartile of the sample and zero otherwise. We argue that firms with high level of 
share (debt) issuance will have a greater negative (positive) impact on CASH-ETR than those with 
low or no share (debt) issuance. In Panel A of Table 5, we report the results of estimating three 
models to demonstrate the effect of high level of share issuance and debt issuance on CASH-ETR. 
In Model 1 (Model 2), we find that the coefficient of high-share-issue (high-debt-issue) is negative 
(positive) and significant at a one percent level. The economic and statistical significance holds 
when we include both dummy variables in Model 3 reported in Panel A of Table 5.  
 
[Insert Panel A of Table 5 about here] 
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Evidence based on Nearest-neighbor (NN) matching test 
It is possible that our baseline regressions are not properly specified and suffer from selection 
bias. Therefore, the baseline regression estimates may be biased. To address this concern and to 
crosscheck our evidence of how the high level of share issuance and debt issuance influence 
CASH-ETR, we apply a nearest-neighbor matching test. In this test, the treatment group is high-
share-issue (high-debt-issue), which equals 1 and the control group is high-share-issue (high-debt-
issue) which equals 0. NN matching involves two stages of regressions. In the first stage, using a 
logit model we match the treatment group with similar characteristics of the control group based 
on the control variable characteristics. In the second stage, we test the impact of treatment, which 
is share issuance or debt issuance, respectively, on CASH-ETR compared to the similar group 
without treatment. The control variables in both stages include Z-score, PROA, Sales, Sales-
growth, Book-to-market ratio (BM), foreign income, leverage, PPE, inventory, R&D, 
Discretionary accruals, loss carryforward (NOL), and change in loss carryforward (ΔNOL). In 
Model 1 and Model 2 of Panel B, we find that the evidence about the impact of high-share-issue 
and high-debt-issue on CASH-ETR is similar to the evidence we presented in Panel A of Table 5. 
Hence, our results are robust to addressing selection bias or model misspecification concerns. 
[Insert Panel B of Table 5 about here] 
 
 First difference regressions 
It is also possible that our baseline regression models suffer from correlated omitted variables. 
There are a couple of methods that can be applied to address this endogeneity concern. One method 
is to apply two-stage least squared regressions by using a valid instrument variable that is related 
to the treatment variable but unrelated to the outcome variable. Another approach is to apply first 
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difference regressions. Edwards et al. (2016) use the first difference regressions method to 
investigate the impact of financial constraints on CASH-ETR. As an additional test, we apply the 
first difference regressions to make sure that we are not capturing spurious estimates. First, we 
replicate Table 4 of Edwards et al. (2016) in Table 6 to ensure that our first difference models, 
variables and the estimates are similar to those of Edwards et al. (2016). The main independent 
variables in the first two models of Table 6 are lagged decile ranks of change measures of financial 
constraints (i.e. Z score and KZ index). Coefficients on both independent variables are negative 
and significant at a 1% level, which is consistent with the findings of Edwards et al. (2016). To 
test the impact of our variables of interest on CASH-ETR, we use current change measures of the 
financial constraints instead of the lagged decile ranks of the change measures as the rest of our 
variables in contemporaneous period.9 We discuss the findings related to our research questions 
below. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Changes in debt issuance and tax planning 
In Table 7, we present the first difference estimates of the association between debt issuance 
and CASH-ETR, which means the dependent variable and independent variables are change 
measures in all of our models presented in Table 7. In Model 1, our specification includes ΔDEBT-
ISSUE and the industry fixed effects. In the subsequent two models, we include two different 
financial constraints (ΔZ in model 2 and ΔKZ in model 3) and the common determinants of tax 
planning. We report the t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firms. In all three 
                                                             
9Two of our control variables are slightly different than those of Edwards et al. (2016). First, instead of total 
leverage we use long-term leverage and second, we use Kothari et al. (2005) discretionary accrual measure instead 
of Frank et al. (2009) discretionary accrual measure. However, in the replication table, we use all of the controls 
variables of Edwards et al. (2016).   
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models, we find evidence that an increase in debt issuance has a statistically significant positive 
association with an increase in CASH-ETR suggesting a negative impact of changes in debt 
issuance on tax avoidance. This finding strengthens our previous support for our first hypothesis 
about the non-negative relation between debt issuance and tax planning for cash savings.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Changes in share issuance and cash savings from tax planning 
In Table 8, we report estimates from the first difference regressions using five different models. 
In model (1), the dependent variable is only ΔSHARE-ISSUE and in the subsequent two models, 
we replicate model (2) and model (3) of Table 7 by replacing ΔDEBT-ISSUE with ΔSHARE-
ISSUE. In model (4) and model (5), we include both ΔSHARE-ISSUE and ΔDEBT-ISSUE, while 
controlling for ΔZ and ΔKZ along with other controls, respectively. We find that, in all of the 
models, the coefficient of ΔSHARE-ISSUE is negative and significant at a 1 percent level. This 
finding lends credence to our main results.  
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Lagged independent variable and tax planning 
 
While the first difference estimation addresses the omitted correlated variable concern, it does 
not mitigate the reverse causality problem meaning that CASH-ETR may affect issuance of 
financial securities. A lagged variable specification addresses the simultaneity problem, in case 
both the dependent variable and independent variable of interest simultaneously affects each other. 
To address both the simultaneity and the reverse causality problem, we create lagged share 
issuance and debt issuance variables along with lagged control variables. The lagged identification 
is a commonly used method, in the areas of economics, finance and accounting literatures, to test 
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causality when there is simultaneity or a reverse causality bias. In Model 1 of Table 9, we find that 
coefficient of lagged share issuance is negative and significant at the one percent level. But the 
economic significance is found to be lower than reported in Table 4. In Model 3, when we include 
both the lagged share and debt issuance, both the economic and statistical significance of share 
issuance remains similar. Overall, the results from Table 9 indicate that firms that issue shares in 
the prior year have lower CASH-ETR. 
 
Future and long-term CASH-ETR 
Relation between share issuance in different periods and CASH-ETR 
Long-term investments are carried out over a period of multiple years and require substantial 
amounts of capital. Therefore, we are interested in examining whether share issuance is a leading 
indicator of tax avoidance by examining its effects on CASH-ETR in years t+1 and t+2.  In Table 
10, we regress CASH-ETR in year t+1 and t+2 on share and debt issuance. In model 3, we create 
long-term CASH-ETR by averaging the CASH-ETR of year t, t+1 and t+2 because one year 
CASH-ETR may reflect a myopic tax avoidance behavior. In Model (1), the dependent variable is 
CASH-ETR at year t+1, in model (2), it is CASH-ETR at year t+2 and in model (3), we use 3YR-
CASH-ETR. In all of the three models, share issuance in all periods is negatively associated with 
CASH-ETR at the 1% level. This finding implies that when firms are issuing shares for 
investments, they engage in a multi-period tax avoidance strategy. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Gross share and gross debt issuance 
So far, we have used net debt and share issuance, which are constructed by deducting debt and 
shares buyouts from the gross debt and share issuance, respectively, so that we capture the actual 
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need for external capital. However, in a given year, the gross amounts of debt and share issuances 
may indicate whether the firm needs to engage in a tax avoidance strategy. Therefore, in this 
subsection of sensitivity analysis, we replace the net share and debt issuance with gross share and 
debt issuance. In Table 11, we present the results of the relation between gross share issuance as 
well as debt issuance and CASH ETR.  In Model (1), we regress CASH-ETR on gross share 
issuance and find that the coefficient of SHARE-ISSUE is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level indicating that an increase in gross share issuance increases cash savings by reducing 
cash effective tax rates. The relationship is opposite between gross DEBT-ISSUE and CASH-ETR 
(Model 2). The coefficient of debt issuance is significant at the 5 percent level. Similar to Table 4, 
in Model (3) of Table 11, we include both gross SHARE-ISSUE and DEBT-ISSUE and observe 
that their relations with CASH-ETR continue to be similar. Taken together, our sample evidence 
suggests that, regardless of whether we use gross or net share issuance in the regression models, 
we find that firms that issue shares tend to reduce cash effective tax rates to generate additional 
capital for their investments through tax planning. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Uncertain tax benefits and tax settlements 
In this section, we provide evidence whether share issuance is related to uncertain tax positions. 
The strategy of saving cash taking uncertain tax positions for investments would backfire when 
the IRS conducts a tax audit. Effective from December 15, 2006, Financial Accounting Standards 
Board’s Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) requires firms to disclose their uncertain tax benefits 
(UTBs), if the tax positions are less than 50 percent likelihood of sustaining upon a tax audit by 
the IRS. UTBs are treated as liabilities. Existing studies document that firms’ tax avoidance is 
positively associated with UTB balances (Lisowsky et al., 2013, Gupta et al., 2014). For our study, 
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a positive association between share issuance and UTBs would indicate that tax avoidance induced 
by share issuance is based on weak positions. On the other hand, an insignificant or negative 
association between the variables would allow us to rule out the possibility that share issuance 
induces tax planning based on uncertain tax positions.  
FIN 48 also requires firms to disclose the amount of tax settlements with the IRS. The relation 
of share issuance to the amount of tax settlements with the IRS provides a corroborative evidence 
regarding uncertain tax positions. In an analytical study, Mills and Sansing (2000, p.85) show that 
when firms report “both the financial accounting income and taxable income”, the IRS is more 
likely to audit those firms that demonstrate a positive book-tax difference than those with “no 
book-tax difference”. Wilson (2009) provides evidence that some of the firms that participate in 
tax havens face tax audit settlements and interest/penalties. Along this line, Cinconte et al. (2014) 
document that firms that report higher levels of unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) face higher 
amounts of tax settlements. Hoi, Wu and Zhang (2013) find evidence that bad corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is a determinant of tax avoidance and tax settlement. Hence, share issuance 
may also show a positive relation with the amount of IRS tax settlement to the extent the former 
induces tax planning leading to uncertain tax positions. Nonetheless, a statistical insignificant 
result would indicate that share issuance induced tax avoidance is carried out based on strong 
merits. Moreover, as the government considers firms as their investment partners (Scholes and 
Wolfson, 1992), it encourages firms to invest by providing R&D tax credits and allowing them to 
carry their losses forward. Also, share issuance signals investment initiatives and is considered 
good for the overall economy. Therefore, the IRS may perceive tax avoidance induced by share 
issuance favorably.  
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In model 1 of Table 12, we present regression results showing the relationship of share issuance 
with UTBs, while controlling for debt issuance along with other control variables in the model. 
The sample period containing UTB and TS measures is between 2007 and 2016 and the sample 
consists of 9,522 firm-year observations. We find that the coefficient of share issuance is 
insignificant implying that share issuance does not influence tax planning based on uncertain tax 
positions. In model 2, we replace the dependent variable with tax settlement. We find the 
coefficient of share issuance to be negative and significant at the 5 percent level. In terms of 
economic significance, the coefficient value of -0.5 means that for one percent increase in the 
amount of share issuance, the amount of tax settlements with the IRS decreases by 0.5 percent. 
This finding may imply that share issuance induced tax avoidance does not suffer from lack of 
merits. It may also imply that the taxing authority may treat such tax planning favorably. 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The widespread corporate tax avoidance behavior in the U.S. and elsewhere has drawn a lot of 
attention in the media and academic research. Recent studies investigate how financial constraints 
induce firms to save cash through tax avoidance. However, these studies do not consider how the 
ability of firms to issue debt or equity may influence corporate tax planning. Thus, in this study, 
we investigate the effect of firms’ issuance of financial securities, debt and equity, on corporate 
tax planning for cash savings. We apply the pecking order theory to predict the relations between 
tax avoidance and debt or equity financing. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that in order to avoid 
high costs of capital in financing investments, firms should use cash first followed by debt and 
then by equity. Following this argument, we predict that debt issuance would not induce firms to 
engage in tax avoidance because debt issuance signals firm profitability and lower need to avoid 
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tax payment for cash savings. In contrast, because equity issuance is the costliest form of financing, 
we predict that firms would save cash internally through tax planning before issuing equity. 
Consistent with our predictions, we find that equity issuance impacts cash savings positively 
by reducing CASH-ETR whereas the relationship of debt issuance with CASH-ETR is the 
opposite. Our results imply that, firms may save cash from tax avoidance after debt issuance but 
not necessarily after equity issuance.  
Although we applied lagged specification to rule out simultaneity concern, the major limitation 
of our study is that we did not test whether financial security issuance and tax planning 
simultaneously affect each other. If valid instrumental variables are found to capture the 
simultaneity effect, future research can investigate further into this area. Future studies could also 
divide equity and debt issues into various levels of risks and investigate whether their association 
with tax avoidance differs across various risk levels. As information-asymmetry and 
compensation-incentives are important factors for debt and equity issuance as well as tax 
avoidance, interaction of debt and equity issuance with information-asymmetry and compensation-
incentives may lead to some interesting findings. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
CASH-ETR  Three-year average total cash tax payment scaled by three-year average 
pretax income less special items 
UTB Log transformed amount of unrecognized tax benefits at the end of the year. 
Tax 
Settlement 
This item represents decreases to Unrecognized Tax Benefits relating to 
settlements with taxing authorities. We log transform it after adding 1 to the 
number. 
SHARE-
ISSUE 
Net proceeds from issuing and repurchasing shares. Gross share issuance 
(SSTK) minus share repurchase (PRSTKC) scaled by total asset (AT) in year 
t. 
DEBT-
ISSUE 
Net proceeds from issuing and retiring debt. Gross debt issuance (DLTIS) 
minus debt retirement (DLTR) scaled by total asset (AT) in year t. 
Z-score The Altman (1968) Z-score is calculated as -1 * {3.3* [(PI + XINT)/AT] + 
1.2* (WCAP/AT) + (SALE/AT) + 1.4* (RE/AT) + 0.6 * [(CHSO * 
PRCC_F)/LT]}.  
KZ index The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) financial constraint index is calculated as 
-1*CashFlowK [(IB + DP)/lag (PPENT)] + 0.28 * Q [(AT + PRCC_F – CSHO 
- CEQ - TXDB)/AT] + 3.13 * DebtTotalCapital [(DLTT + DLC)/(DLTT + 
DLC + SEQ)] - 39.36 * DividendsK [(DVC + DVP)/lag(PPENT)] - 1.31* 
CashK [CHE/lag(PPENT)].  
SALES Logarithm of one plus the amount of sales denoted in million dollars.  
SALES 
GROWTH 
The change in sales between year t and year t-1 scaled by sales of year t-1.  
DisAccruals Discretionary accruals measured following Kothari et al. (2005) 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt scaled by total assets 
R&D R&D expense scaled by assets 
PROA Pretax income scaled by total assets. Operating cash flow scaled by total 
assets 
PPE Gross property plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets 
F-Income Foreign income scaled by lagged assets (AT). If foreign income values are 
missing values, we set them to zero.  
Inventory Total inventory (INVT) scaled by lagged total asset. 
NOL Dummy variable which equals one if a firm has a positive loss carry 
forward and zero otherwise.  
∆NOL Change in tax loss carry forward (TLCF) between current year and prior 
year scaled by lagged total asset (AT) 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Level variable 
VARIABLE N SD MEAN P25 P50 P75 P90 
CASH-ETR 63,079 0.2154 0.2519 0.0766 0.2324 0.3570 0.4865 
SHARE ISSUE 63,079 0.1044 0.0319 0.00 0.00 0.0070 0.0687 
DEBT ISSUE 63,079 0.0702 0.0287 0.00 0.00 0.0202 0.0986 
Z-SCORE 63,079 7.8406 -5.1451 -5.7828 -3.7091 -2.4330 -1.556 
KZ 63,079 40.071 -9.5535 -5.6391 -1.2692 0.5472 1.48160 
PROA 63,079 0.0814 0.1033 0.0453 0.0844 0.1391 0.2075 
SALES 63,079 2.1087 5.74787 4.25975 5.6839 7.1986 8.58610 
SALES_GROWTH 63,079 0.5972 0.2116 0.0152 0.1046 0.2493 0.5052 
BM 63,079 0.7426 0.6006 0.2889 0.4850 0.78198 1.2010 
FINCOME 63,079 0.0287 0.0123 0.00 0.00 0.0088 0.0509 
LEVERAGE 63,079 0.1711 0.1694 0.008 0.1311 0.2730 0.4082 
PPE 63,079 0.4860 0.6349 0.2789 0.5259 0.8738 1.2432 
INVENTORY 63,079 0.1771 0.1683 0.0194 0.1223 0.2515 0.4102 
RD 63,079 0.1222 0.0296 0.00 0.00 0.0271 0.0989 
DisAccruals 63,079 0.1338 0.0524 -0.0117 0.0362 0.0962 0.1791 
NOL 63,079 0.4883 0.6073 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of change variables. 
VARIABLE N SD MEAN P25 P50 P75 P90 
ΔCASH-ETR 43,289 0.2293 0.0144 -0.0656 0.005 0.093 0.2366 
ΔSHARE-ISSUE 43,289 0.1031 -0.0146 -0.0015 0.00 0.0004 0.0096 
ΔDEBT-ISSUE 43,289 0.0902 -0.0020 0.00 0.00 0.002 0.0748 
ΔZ 43,289 4.5516 0.1386 -0.5447 -0.0173 0.5764 1.8689 
ΔKZ 43,289 28.088 0.6896 -0.6566 -0.0458 0.5540 2.7680 
ΔPROA 43,289 0.0591 -0.0028 -0.0266 -0.00 0.0294 0.0532 
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ΔSALES 43,289 0.2296 0.1157 0.0089 0.0875 0.1938 0.3444 
ΔSALES_GRO~H 43,289 0.540 -0.0436 -0.1243 -0.0126 0.0860 0.2516 
ΔBM 43,289 0.4472 0.0338 -0.0843 0.00961 0.1241 0.3244 
ΔFINCOME 43,289 0.0159 0.0003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0086 
ΔLEVERAGE 43,289 0.0798 0.0020 -0.0251 -0.00 0.0135 0.0759 
ΔPPE 43,289 0.2139 -0.0105 -0.04412 0.0025 0.0449 0.1156 
ΔINVENTORY 43,289 0.0736 -0.0047 -0.01504 0.00 0.0103 0.0458 
ΔRD 43,289 0.0161 0.0005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0047 
Δ DisAccruals 43,289 0.1323 0.0003 -0.0542 0.0012 0.0566 0.1286 
ΔNOL 43,289 0.2563 0.0089 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 2: Correlation Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) CASH-ETR  -0.093 0.027 -0.164 -0.064 0.111 0.143 -0.101 0.043 0.035 -0.032 -0.044 0.144 -0.057 -0.020 -0.297 
(2) SHARE-ISSUE -0.065  -0.048 -0.157 -0.059 0.025 -0.172 0.336 -0.190 -0.053 -0.099 -0.035 0.013 0.093 0.084 0.008 
(3) DEBT-ISSUE 0.009 -0.036  0.272 0.209 -0.134 0.160 0.119 -0.019 0.026 0.438 0.166 0.016 -0.108 0.102 0.014 
(4) Z-SCORE -0.016 -0.160 0.131  0.481 -0.575 0.165 -0.172 0.309 -0.013 0.617 0.215 -0.164 -0.195 0.071 0.243 
(5) KZ 0.024 -0.158 0.010 0.139  -0.362 0.087 -0.051 0.182 -0.110 0.550 0.508 0.049 -0.305 0.091 0.038 
(6) PROA -0.008 0.034 -0.084 -0.288 -0.191  -0.013 0.185 -0.401 0.082 -0.307 -0.051 0.028 0.073 -0.057 -0.211 
(7) SALES 0.085 -0.194 0.033 0.112 0.126 -0.063  -0.145 -0.144 0.319 0.330 0.091 -0.042 -0.065 -0.126 0.113 
(8) SALES GROWTH -0.100 0.226 0.101 -0.106 -0.112 0.066 -0.131  -0.218 -0.048 -0.066 -0.010 0.022 0.020 0.096 -0.032 
(9) BM 0.059 -0.093 -0.061 0.053 0.065 -0.230 -0.100 -0.053  -0.136 -0.022 0.059 0.136 -0.159 0.063 -0.039 
(10) FINCOME -0.019 -0.047 0.004 -0.016 0.005 0.126 0.255 -0.021 -0.095  0.035 -0.073 0.014 0.237 -0.055 0.147 
(11) LEVERAGE -0.041 -0.118 0.391 0.302 0.138 -0.269 0.254 -0.038 -0.098 -0.030  0.267 -0.057 -0.238 0.019 0.098 
(12) PPE -0.076 0.022 0.130 0.122 0.190 -0.065 0.031 0.118 0.009 -0.069 0.204  -0.075 -0.242 0.111 -0.055 
(13) INVENTORY 0.097 0.065 0.032 -0.025 0.047 0.009 -0.095 0.073 0.062 -0.045 -0.105 -0.162  0.076 0.100 -0.149 
(14) RD -0.057 0.107 0.001 0.038 -0.074 0.058 -0.099 0.031 -0.060 0.053 -0.106 -0.121 -0.060  -0.049 0.117 
(15) DiscAccruals -0.035 0.172 0.077 0.027 -0.007 0.045 -0.162 0.175 -0.018 -0.044 -0.008 0.114 0.135 0.051  0.018 
(16) NOL -0.238 -0.033 0.002 0.114 0.008 -0.186 0.106 0.014 -0.021 0.132 0.104 -0.024 -0.153 0.067 0.032  
 
Note: Lower-triangular cells report Pearson's correlation coefficients, upper-triangular cells are Spearman’s rank correlation. All variables are 
defined in Table A 
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Figure 2A: predicted value of CASH-ETR by debt issuance 
 
Figure 2B: predicted value of CASH-ETR by share issuance 
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Table 3: OLS regressions of CASH-ETR on debt issuance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CASH-ETR CASH-ETR CASH-ETR 
    
DEBT-ISSUE 0.0458*** 0.1137*** 0.1127*** 
 (3.544) (7.004) (6.949) 
Z-SCORE  -0.0000  
  (-0.206)  
KZ-SCORE   -0.0000 
   (-1.181) 
ROA  -0.1065*** -0.1083*** 
  (-5.906) (-6.252) 
SALES  0.0062*** 0.0063*** 
  (8.455) (8.505) 
SALES GROWTH  -0.0485*** -0.0486*** 
  (-11.979) (-12.066) 
BM  0.0105*** 0.0105*** 
  (4.283) (4.286) 
F-INCOME  -0.1662*** -0.1656*** 
  (-4.120) (-4.111) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0804*** -0.0804*** 
  (-9.210) (-9.340) 
PPE  -0.0223*** -0.0218*** 
  (-7.044) (-6.831) 
INVENTORY  0.0376*** 0.0383*** 
  (4.188) (4.263) 
R&D  -0.1682*** -0.1681*** 
  (-6.935) (-7.023) 
DiscAccruals  0.0591*** 0.0595*** 
  (5.895) (5.914) 
NOL  -0.0551*** -0.0551*** 
  (-20.506) (-20.504) 
ΔNOL  0.0309*** 0.0308*** 
  (7.823) (7.808) 
CASH-ETRt-1  0.2858*** 0.2858*** 
  (36.428) (36.426) 
CONSTANT 0.2506*** 0.2071*** 0.2060*** 
 (172.329) (23.351) (23.191) 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES  YES 
YEAR FE NO YES  YES 
OBSERVATIONS 63,079 43,289 43,289 
R2 0.026 0.185 0.185 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.183 0.183 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: OLS regressions of CASH-ETR on share issuance and debt issuance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CASH-ETR CASH-ETR CASH-ETR CASH-ETR CASH-ETR 
      
SHARE-ISSUE -0.1182*** -0.0922*** -0.0903*** -0.0879*** -0.0859*** 
 (-14.144) (-5.121) (-5.076) (-4.867) (-4.803) 
DEBT-ISSUE    0.1113*** 0.1101*** 
    (6.854) (6.787) 
Z-SCORE  -0.0002  -0.0002  
  (-0.928)  (-0.970)  
KZ-SCORE   -0.0001*  -0.0000 
   (-1.667)  (-1.329) 
ROA  -0.1170*** -0.1164*** -0.1150*** -0.1135*** 
  (-6.418) (-6.695) (-6.305) (-6.517) 
SALES  0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 
  (7.983) (8.032) (8.282) (8.293) 
SALES GROWTH  -0.0430*** -0.0432*** -0.0458*** -0.0458*** 
  (-11.061) (-11.122) (-11.327) (-11.378) 
BM  0.0097*** 0.0096*** 0.0099*** 0.0098*** 
  (3.975) (3.936) (4.033) (3.990) 
F-INCOME  -0.1557*** -0.1560*** -0.1653*** -0.1658*** 
  (-3.874) (-3.887) (-4.100) (-4.118) 
LEVERAGE  -0.0616*** -0.0628*** -0.0818*** -0.0828*** 
  (-7.811) (-8.105) (-9.356) (-9.600) 
PPE  -0.0206*** -0.0200*** -0.0221*** -0.0217*** 
  (-6.526) (-6.304) (-6.975) (-6.794) 
INVENTORY  0.0438*** 0.0443*** 0.0387*** 0.0391*** 
  (4.918) (4.979) (4.319) (4.361) 
R&D  -0.1603*** -0.1583*** -0.1673*** -0.1650*** 
  (-6.620) (-6.634) (-6.896) (-6.901) 
DiscAccruals  0.0662*** 0.0666*** 0.0632*** 0.0635*** 
  (6.584) (6.607) (6.281) (6.297) 
NOL  -0.0556*** -0.0557*** -0.0549*** -0.0550*** 
  (-20.738) (-20.759) (-20.442) (-20.474) 
ΔNOL  0.0317*** 0.0317*** 0.0309*** 0.0309*** 
  (8.031) (8.024) (7.825) (7.827) 
CASH-ETRt-1  0.2853*** 0.2854*** 0.2848*** 0.2849*** 
  (36.296) (36.301) (36.252) (36.260) 
CONSTANT 0.2557*** 0.2084*** 0.2078*** 0.2089*** 0.2087*** 
 (177.963) (23.527) (23.414) (23.547) (23.471) 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES  YES YES YES  
YEAR FE NO YES YES  YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 63,079 43,289 43,289 43,289 43,289 
R2 0.029 0.185 0.185 0.186 0.186 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.183 0.183 0.184 0.184 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
35 
 
Table 5: Effect of CASH-ETR on high share issuance and high debt issuance 
Panel A: OLS Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CASH-ETR CASH-ETR CASH-ETR 
    
HIGH-SHARE-ISSUE -0.0198***  -0.0197*** 
 (-8.239)  (-8.181) 
HIGH-DEBT-ISSUE  0.0100*** 0.0098*** 
  (4.257) (4.173) 
Z-SCORE -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 
 (-0.910) (-0.232) (-1.008) 
ROA -0.1131*** -0.1053*** -0.1103*** 
 (-6.282) (-5.835) (-6.119) 
SALES 0.0058*** 0.0059*** 0.0057*** 
 (7.876) (8.006) (7.730) 
SALES GROWTH -0.0421*** -0.0467*** -0.0430*** 
 (-11.077) (-11.786) (-11.137) 
BM 0.0089*** 0.0104*** 0.0089*** 
 (3.657) (4.224) (3.650) 
F-INCOME -0.1590*** -0.1620*** -0.1645*** 
 (-3.967) (-4.023) (-4.098) 
LEVERAGE -0.0628*** -0.0691*** -0.0719*** 
 (-7.967) (-8.284) (-8.615) 
PPE -0.0210*** -0.0216*** -0.0218*** 
 (-6.665) (-6.818) (-6.890) 
INVENTORY 0.0440*** 0.0399*** 0.0412*** 
 (4.953) (4.452) (4.618) 
R&D -0.1477*** -0.1624*** -0.1491*** 
 (-6.082) (-6.712) (-6.141) 
DiscAccruals 0.0654*** 0.0598*** 0.0632*** 
 (6.536) (5.960) (6.312) 
NOL -0.0553*** -0.0555*** -0.0550*** 
 (-20.648) (-20.640) (-20.482) 
ΔNOL 0.0315*** 0.0314*** 0.0312*** 
 (7.997) (7.954) (7.918) 
CASH-ETRt-1 0.2843*** 0.2863*** 0.2843*** 
 (36.078) (36.469) (36.068) 
CONSTANT 0.2104*** 0.2068*** 0.2106*** 
 (23.798) (23.316) (23.791) 
INDUSTRY FE YES  YES YES 
YEAR FE YES  YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 43,289 43,289 43,289 
R2 0.185 0.184 0.186 
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.182 0.184 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Panel B Nearest-neighbor Matching 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES CASH-ETR CASH-ETR 
   
HIGH-SHARE-
ISSUE 
-0.018***  
 (-6.08)  
HIGH-DEBT-ISSUE  0.0111*** 
  (3.96) 
OBSERVATIONS 43,289 43,289 
   
Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
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Table 6: Replication of Table 4 of Edwards et al. (2016)- regressions of changes in CASH-ETR 
on changes in Z-score and KZ index. 
 (2) (1) 
VARIABLES ΔCASH-ETR ΔCASH-ETR 
   
ΔZ-Scoret-1  -0.0037*** 
  (-7.756) 
ΔKZ t-1 -0.0057***  
 (-12.777)  
ΔROA -0.5648*** -0.5810*** 
 (-13.421) (-13.714) 
ΔSALES 0.0215*** 0.0164** 
 (2.989) (2.286) 
ΔSALES GROWTH -0.0363*** -0.0327*** 
 (-6.275) (-5.823) 
ΔBM 0.0123** 0.0104** 
 (2.532) (2.142) 
ΔF-INCOME -0.7302*** -0.7581*** 
 (-6.843) (-7.095) 
ΔLEVERAGE 0.0168 0.0166 
 (1.047) (1.030) 
ΔPPE -0.0048 -0.0150 
 (-0.505) (-1.567) 
ΔINVENTORY -0.0296 -0.0501* 
 (-1.078) (-1.804) 
ΔR&D 0.0204 0.0323 
 (0.198) (0.311) 
ΔDiscAccruals-Frank -0.0767*** -0.0652*** 
 (-4.926) (-4.173) 
ΔNOL -0.0219*** -0.0218*** 
 (-4.197) (-4.137) 
CONSTANT 0.0282*** 0.0196*** 
 (13.304) (8.488) 
OBSERVATIONS 31,275 31,275 
R2 0.046 0.043 
Adjusted R2 0.0437 0.0404 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 7: Regressions of changes in CASH-ETR on changes in debt issuance. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ΔCASH-ETR ΔCASH-ETR ΔCASH-ETR 
    
ΔDEBT-ISSUE 0.0626*** 0.0761*** 0.0740*** 
 (4.623) (4.379) (4.262) 
ΔZ  -0.0009***  
  (-4.171)  
ΔKZ   -0.0000 
   (-0.233) 
ΔROA  -0.6192*** -0.6074*** 
  (-19.336) (-19.190) 
ΔSALES  0.0170*** 0.0159*** 
  (2.997) (2.784) 
ΔSALES GROWTH  -0.0186*** -0.0182*** 
  (-6.628) (-6.516) 
ΔBM  0.0143*** 0.0133*** 
  (4.316) (4.058) 
ΔF-INCOME  -0.7273*** -0.7299*** 
  (-7.778) (-7.813) 
ΔLEVERAGE  -0.0611*** -0.0673*** 
  (-3.252) (-3.601) 
ΔPPE  -0.0197*** -0.0198*** 
  (-2.854) (-2.879) 
ΔINVENTORY  -0.1244*** -0.1255*** 
  (-5.864) (-5.910) 
ΔR&D  0.1243 0.1163 
  (1.608) (1.501) 
ΔDiscAccruals  0.1198*** 0.1205*** 
  (11.077) (11.138) 
ΔNOL  -0.0254*** -0.0254*** 
  (-5.507) (-5.505) 
CONSTANT 0.0144*** 0.0095*** 0.0096*** 
 (19.605) (9.389) (9.490) 
OBSERVATIONS 43,289 43,289 43,289 
R2 0.0015 0.041 0.041 
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.0394 0.0391 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Regressions of changes in CASH-ETR on changes in share issuance and changes in 
debt issuance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ΔCASH-ETR ΔCASH-ETR ΔCASH-ETR ΔCASH-ETR ΔCASH-ETR 
      
ΔSHARE-ISSUE -0.0599*** -0.0679*** -0.0613*** -0.0637*** -0.0566*** 
 (-5.276) (-5.653) (-5.155) (-5.287) (-4.743) 
ΔDEBT-ISSUE    0.0686*** 0.0664*** 
    (3.951) (3.816) 
ΔZ  -0.0012***  -0.0012***  
  (-5.005)  (-5.085)  
ΔKZ   -0.0001  -0.0000 
   (-1.220)  (-0.980) 
ΔROA  -0.6291*** -0.6152*** -0.6278*** -0.6133*** 
  (-19.505) (-19.352) (-19.488) (-19.308) 
ΔSALES  0.0136** 0.0129** 0.0138** 0.0130** 
  (2.371) (2.241) (2.414) (2.268) 
ΔSALES GROWTH  -0.0186*** -0.0184*** -0.0182*** -0.0179*** 
  (-6.652) (-6.581) (-6.495) (-6.414) 
ΔBM  0.0135*** 0.0124*** 0.0138*** 0.0128*** 
  (4.085) (3.788) (4.183) (3.876) 
ΔF-INCOME  -0.7092*** -0.7131*** -0.7193*** -0.7232*** 
  (-7.609) (-7.659) (-7.697) (-7.746) 
ΔLEVERAGE  -0.0262* -0.0346** -0.0666*** -0.0737*** 
  (-1.678) (-2.236) (-3.537) (-3.927) 
ΔPPE  -0.0099 -0.0106 -0.0155** -0.0161** 
  (-1.474) (-1.588) (-2.238) (-2.330) 
ΔINVENTORY  -0.1027*** -0.1059*** -0.1128*** -0.1157*** 
  (-4.846) (-4.996) (-5.292) (-5.425) 
ΔR&D  0.1112 0.1049 0.1108 0.1040 
  (1.442) (1.359) (1.437) (1.345) 
ΔDiscAccruals  0.1233*** 0.1240*** 0.1227*** 0.1233*** 
  (11.393) (11.435) (11.341) (11.381) 
ΔNOL  -0.0258*** -0.0257*** -0.0255*** -0.0254*** 
  (-5.577) (-5.566) (-5.509) (-5.501) 
CONSTANT 0.0136*** 0.0092*** 0.0094*** 0.0091*** 0.0093*** 
 (18.480) (9.149) (9.277) (9.032) (9.177) 
OBSERVATIONS 43,289 43,289 43,289 43,289 43,289 
R2 0.0016 0.0412 0.0408 0.0416 0.0412 
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.0397 0.0392 0.0401 0.0396 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 9: Regressions of CASH ETR on lagged explanatory variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CASH-ETR CASH-ETR CASH-ETR 
    
SHARE-ISSUE t-1 -0.0329***  -0.0323*** 
 (-3.043)  (-2.985) 
DEBT-ISSUE t-1 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 
 (6.313) (6.851) (6.299) 
Z-SCORE t-1 0.2808*** 0.2848*** 0.2806*** 
 (14.940) (15.202) (14.920) 
ROA t-1 0.0101*** 0.0102*** 0.0101*** 
 (10.535) (10.702) (10.552) 
SALES t-1 -0.0096*** -0.0109*** -0.0098*** 
 (-4.650) (-5.298) (-4.766) 
SALES GROWTH t-1 0.0183*** 0.0188*** 0.0183*** 
 (6.712) (6.902) (6.717) 
BM t-1 -0.0479 -0.0495 -0.0492 
 (-0.874) (-0.901) (-0.897) 
F-INCOME t-1 -0.0711*** -0.0737*** -0.0742*** 
 (-7.396) (-7.033) (-7.092) 
LEVERAGE t-1 -0.0210*** -0.0215*** -0.0213*** 
 (-5.750) (-5.845) (-5.783) 
PPE t-1 0.0914*** 0.0891*** 0.0906*** 
 (8.279) (8.030) (8.144) 
INVENTORY t-1 -0.2784*** -0.2815*** -0.2797*** 
 (-9.510) (-9.574) (-9.529) 
R&D t-1 -0.0259*** -0.0290*** -0.0262*** 
 (-2.595) (-2.911) (-2.624) 
DiscAccruals t-1 -0.0674*** -0.0673*** -0.0672*** 
 (-20.939) (-20.843) (-20.839) 
NOL t-1 -0.0219*** -0.0221*** -0.0219*** 
 (-5.462) (-5.500) (-5.468) 
ΔNOL t-1  0.0210 0.0189 
  (1.240) (1.112) 
CONSTANT 0.2143*** 0.2132*** 0.2144*** 
 (21.984) (21.854) (21.983) 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES  YES 
YEAR FE YES YES  YES 
OBSERVATIONS 43,289 43,289 43,289 
R2 0.117 0.117 0.117 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.115 0.115 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 10: Regressions of future and long-term CASH ETR on share and debt issuance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CASH-ETRt+1 CASH-ETR t+2 3YR-CASH-ETR 
    
SHARE-ISSUE -0.1306*** -0.1648*** -0.1115** 
 (-5.339) (-6.218) (-2.257) 
DEBT-ISSUE -0.0117 -0.0227 0.0358 
 (-0.577) (-1.030) (1.499) 
Z-SCORE 0.0014*** 0.0002 0.0011*** 
 (5.930) (0.580) (3.391) 
ROA 0.2853*** 0.1374*** 0.2037*** 
 (12.468) (5.727) (5.979) 
SALES 0.0076*** 0.0058*** 0.0065*** 
 (6.853) (4.816) (4.374) 
SALES GROWTH -0.0081** -0.0113** -0.0314*** 
 (-1.972) (-2.448) (-5.693) 
BM 0.0217*** 0.0088** 0.0094 
 (5.368) (2.164) (1.631) 
F-INCOME -0.1061* -0.0638 -0.1260 
 (-1.757) (-0.966) (-1.490) 
LEVERAGE -0.0807*** -0.0826*** -0.1070*** 
 (-6.468) (-6.131) (-5.673) 
PPE -0.0211*** -0.0183*** -0.0302*** 
 (-4.655) (-3.758) (-3.927) 
INVENTORY 0.0960*** 0.0750*** 0.0412** 
 (7.182) (5.340) (2.300) 
R&D -0.2939*** -0.2767*** -0.3308*** 
 (-8.067) (-5.453) (-5.372) 
DiscAccruals -0.0122 -0.0176 0.0452** 
 (-0.926) (-1.235) (2.126) 
NOL -0.0503*** -0.0413*** -0.0485*** 
 (-13.964) (-10.685) (-9.648) 
ΔNOL 0.0121*** 0.0210*** 0.0342*** 
 (2.582) (4.243) (5.988) 
CONSTANT 0.2894*** 0.3425*** 0.3380*** 
 (25.310) (26.382) (18.820) 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES  YES 
YEAR FE YES YES  YES 
OBSERVATIONS 31,275 26,264 23,228 
R2 0.110 0.087 0.091 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.084 0.087 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 11: Regression of CASH-ETR on gross share and debt issuance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CASH-ETR CASH-ETR CASH-ETR 
    
GSHARE-ISSUE -0.0921***  -0.0928*** 
 (-5.440)  (-5.485) 
GDEBT-ISSUE  0.0141** 0.0145** 
  (2.429) (2.501) 
Z-SCORE -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 
 (-0.927) (-0.119) (-0.929) 
ROA -0.1147*** -0.1077*** -0.1143*** 
 (-6.316) (-5.975) (-6.294) 
SALES 0.0059*** 0.0060*** 0.0059*** 
 (8.052) (8.191) (8.086) 
SALES GROWTH -0.0431*** -0.0461*** -0.0435*** 
 (-11.123) (-11.768) (-11.155) 
BM 0.0096*** 0.0103*** 0.0095*** 
 (3.922) (4.201) (3.883) 
F-INCOME -0.1535*** -0.1569*** -0.1540*** 
 (-3.822) (-3.897) (-3.829) 
LEVERAGE -0.0615*** -0.0666*** -0.0687*** 
 (-7.799) (-7.883) (-8.101) 
PPE -0.0206*** -0.0211*** -0.0209*** 
 (-6.538) (-6.694) (-6.647) 
INVENTORY 0.0437*** 0.0404*** 0.0414*** 
 (4.910) (4.512) (4.623) 
R&D -0.1576*** -0.1592*** -0.1556*** 
 (-6.512) (-6.571) (-6.425) 
DiscAccruals 0.0658*** 0.0623*** 0.0661*** 
 (6.551) (6.212) (6.581) 
NOL -0.0556*** -0.0559*** -0.0556*** 
 (-20.738) (-20.814) (-20.738) 
ΔNOL 0.0317*** 0.0317*** 0.0317*** 
 (8.033) (8.029) (8.028) 
CASH-ETRt-1 0.2853*** 0.2863*** 0.2852*** 
 (36.308) (36.461) (36.287) 
CONSTANT 0.2081*** 0.2065*** 0.2081*** 
 (23.505) (23.298) (23.484) 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES  YES 
YEAR FE YES YES  YES 
OBSERVATIONS 43,289 43,289 43,289 
R2 0.185 0.184 0.185 
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.182 0.183 
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 12: The effects of share and debt issuance on UTB and tax Settlement 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES UTB TAX SETTLEMENT 
   
SHARE-ISSUE -0.2773 -0.5009** 
 (-0.641) (-2.141) 
DEBT-ISSUE -0.1356 -0.2406* 
 (-0.661) (-1.743) 
KZ-SCORE -0.0019*** -0.0013*** 
 (-4.266) (-5.111) 
ROA -0.4521 -0.4541** 
 (-1.536) (-2.392) 
SALES 0.8463*** 0.3640*** 
 (46.454) (22.377) 
SALES GROWTH -0.3784*** -0.2489*** 
 (-3.437) (-3.516) 
BM -0.0077 0.0110 
 (-0.226) (0.478) 
F-INCOME 6.7668*** 1.4824*** 
 (9.554) (2.831) 
LEVERAGE 0.0984 -0.3574*** 
 (0.646) (-3.525) 
PPE -0.3242*** -0.1081** 
 (-4.635) (-2.292) 
INVENTORY -0.8360*** -0.3207** 
 (-3.585) (-2.169) 
R&D 4.5313*** 1.3438*** 
 (10.472) (4.106) 
DiscAccruals 0.2891* 0.4030*** 
 (1.668) (3.647) 
NOL -0.0583 -0.1084*** 
 (-0.935) (-2.800) 
ΔNOL -0.0369 0.0719 
 (-0.636) (1.526) 
CONSTANT -3.8943*** -1.8818*** 
 (-26.189) (-16.002) 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES  
YEAR FE YES YES  
OBSERVATIONS 9,522 9,313 
R2 0.697 0.355 
Adjusted R2   
Note: All variables are defined in Table A. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are in parenthesis; ***, **, * represent statistical significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
